Posteado por: aberriberri | mayo 2, 2012

ENAMen balioak (eta 2)

Imanol Lizarralde

José María Setien gotzaiak giza balioak politika aurreko irizpide etikoaren osagaiak zirela adierazten zuen. Olariagarentzat alderantziz gertatzen da, etika politikaren menpean jarri behar da. Zergatik? Bere ustez politika kontrajarriek ez dutelako akordio ala elkar bizitzaren balio komunik izan behar. Etikak ez du izan behar inongo gizartearen elkar bizitzaren euskarri, eta ondorioz sistema demokratikoa ezin daiteke erreformatu, errotik txikitu behar da goitik-behera. Horregatik esaten du:

“Humanismo honek ulertarazi nahi du kapitalismoaren zein demokraziaren efektu errepresibo eta kriminalak ez direla haien faktore estrukturalen ondorio, baizik eta etikoki hobetzea posible den sistema baten akzidenteak”.

Ikuspegi honen bitartez, Olariagak pentsatzen du gizarteak subjektu erraldoiek eraikitzen dutela. Hori, noski, ez da egia, gizartea gizaki multzoz osatutako sare anitza baita. Subjektu handiak (partidoak, mugimenduak, instituzioak…) gero sortu dira. Baina iraultza handien mitoaren paradigmaren azpian, Olariagak subjektuek eraikitako sistemetan amets egiten du. Amets horiek egi bihurtu ala praktikan jarri nahi izan direnean badakigu zenbateko hondamendia ekarri dioten munduari eta Euskalerriari.

Balioek ala etikak ere borroka eremu bat osatzen dute, beste eremu batzuekin batera: Herri borroka eta borroka instituzionala kamuts izango baitira borroka ideologiko honi adarretatik heltzen ez badiogu”. Orain 30 urte, politikaren liluramenduaren garaian, ez ziren balioak aipatu beharrik, iraultza politikoak askoren amets gertatzen baitziren. Gaurko egunean, gizabanakoak bere balioak eraiki ala aukeratu egin dituela uste duenean, Olariagak darabilen borroka ikuspegitik ezinbestekoa gertatzen da balioen aipamena, nahiz eta hau egiten den betiko politika iraultzailearen mesedetan. Horregatik esaten du “humanistei” begira:

Ez da nahikoa ideologia honen predikatzaileen kontra beronen kontraesanak azpimarratzen ibiltzea (…); aitzitik, alde batetik, diskurtso horren erraiak biluzi behar dira, eta bestetik, gure balioez bete bakea, demokrazia, giza duintasuna eta askatasuna bezalako kontzeptu hutsak”.

Etsaia bere kontraesanetan eraso eta etsaiaren kontzeptuak esanahi berri eta kontrajarriez bete eta beraietaz jabetu, materialismo dialektikoak erakutsi duen teknika da, Olariagak hemen aplikatu duena. Horrek esan nahi du ENAM bakeaz, askatasunaz, giza duintasunaz eta demokraziaz mintzo denean, berak nahi dituen esanahiak ematen dizkiola hitz horiei. Posible da, horrela, ETAk bere historian demostratu duen bezala, borroka armatua praktikan jartzea eta, era berean, bakezko proposamena aurkeztea. Ikuspegi dialektiko honen ondorioz, Olariagak balioen eskizofrenia proposatzen du, Althusserri jarraituz “teorikoki antihumanistak eta praktikan humanistak” izatea, adibidez, nahiz eta kontrako kasua gehienetan gertatu, hau da, hitz goxo humanistez mozorrotu eta justifikatu egiten den ENAMko aparailuen gogorkeri praktikoa.

Alain Badiou teoriko maoistaren etikaren bideari jarraituz, Olariagak “bestea”-ren etika salatzen du. Gutxiengoen eta etorkinen errespetua, horren arabera, asimilazio engainu bat besterik ez da, beltza, homosexuala, musulmana, moroa, ijitoa eta abertzale erradikala sistemaren barruan kokatu dadin. Hemen ere Olariagak ez du kontuan hartzen bi eredu ditugula, eredu frantses-jakobinoa, non gutxiengo delako horiek estatu logikaren zeinuetara makurtu behar diren eta, beraz, beren ezaugarri erlijioso, kultural, sexual eta nazionalak horren menpe jarri behar dituzten; eta anglosaxoi herrietan dagoen kultura anitzetako eredua, non eta estatuaren ezaugarrietara asimilaziorik ez den eskatzen eta gutxiengo horiek beren egitasmo propioa eraikitzeko autonomia daukaten. Olariagak, noski, antzinako kontraesan nagusi ekonomikoaren haustura eta gatazka banaketa du gogoan, gutxiengo horiek ez baititu ikusi nahi “demokrata-parlamentarioa” eta “merkatu-ekonomia”-ren araberako sistemaren azpian, lehen artikuluan esan bezala, Olariagak lotu egiten dituelako demokrazia ordezkatu eredua eta merkatu-ekonomia. Baina demokrazia parlamentarioa eta merkatu ekonomiaren arteko ezkontza ez da ezinbestekoa, Txina eta beste hainbat herrialde diktatorialen ereduek erakusten diguten bezala.

“Bestea”ren etikak, Olariagaren ustetan, “Bat”-a suposatzen du, subjektu modu zehatza dena (“zuria, heterosexuala, euskaldun demokrata… balore humanista mendebaldarrak dituena”). Olariagak ez du aipatzen, ordea, Bat delako horri egindako kritika, bai Alain Badiou unibertsitate irakasle eta filosofo frantsesaren aldetik eta bai bere aldetik, mendebalde horren barrutik egina dela eta gehienetan Bat horren ezaugarrietaz jantzita dagoen jendearen aldetik datorrela. Olariaga eta Badiouren marxismoak ez die autonomiarik eskaintzen gutxiengoei eta aberri nortasun txikiei, hauek derrigor lerratu behar baitira beraiek planteatzen duten gatazka moldera, beren politika iraultzailearen asimilazioa eskatzen diete, bestela etsaiaren kategorian sartuko bailirateke. Olariagak ere dio, etika kantiarraren kontra, gizakia ez dela helburu izan behar, bitarteko baizik, eta ikusita mundua kontraesan ekonomiko nagusiaren arabera moldatzen duela, subjektu erraldoi iraultzaileren baten mendeko izatea deliberatua da orduan.

Ez da harritzekoa artikulua Heidegger filosofo alemaniarraren hitzekin bukatzea:  “Izan ere, zer da hau baino `logikoagoa’: humanismoa ukatzen duenari basakeriaren baieztapena besterik ez zaiola geratzen esatea?”, zioen Heideggerrek ironikoki Gutuna humanismoari buruz (Klasikoak, 2004) idatzian”. Ez da harritzekoa, Heidegger, nazismoaren eta eskuin-muturraren hainbeste filosofoekin batera, mendebaldeko dekadentzia, filosofiaren heriotza eta gizakiaren amaieraren teorien adierazle handienetakoa delako. Hein horretan, elkar besarkatu egiten dira eskuin-muturreko eta ezker-muturreko pentsalariak, bai batzuk eta bai besteek etsai berdina dutenez gero: etika kristau humanista eta bere ondorioko gizarte demokratikoa. Naziek eta komunistek kritika berdina egin zioten mendebaldeko gizarteari: giza izate naturala ukatu egiten zuela ezin konplituzko perfekzio etiko baten mesedetan. Pentsamolde horiek praktikan izan duten eragina ezaguna da denengatik. Kristau-humanista etikaren ideala akaso konplitu ezina izan daiteke, baina gizakiaren gutizi gaiztoei muga jarri die. Setien gotzaiak esan bezala, etikaren funtzioa ez da gizartea moldatzea, politikaren ahalmen oro boteretsuei muga bat jartzea baizik. Olariagak, ordea, ENAMen ikuspegiari jarraituz, etika eta balioak bere politika iraultzailearen gurdiko zaldi bezala erabili nahi ditu.

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Responses

  1. Merezi du artikulu hau irakurtzea Olariagaren pentsalari maisuei buruz (Zizek eta Alain Badiou): http://www.newstatesman.com/…/slavoj-zizek-intellect

    Esanguratsua Badiouren aipamena: “Egun etsaia ez da deitzen Inperioa ala Kapitala. Deitzen da Demokrazia”.

    Ala Zizek-i galdetzen diotenean zein den berarentzat sozial ordenik onena:
    “Komunismoa! Erabat konforme nago berdintasunarekin, terrore ikutu batekin”.

  2. Kaixo Lagunas,

    Un análisis muy acertado, los malos son comunistas y nazis, como lo demuestra que citen a Heidegger, se empieza por citar a Heidegger y se acaba montando campos de concentración y deportaciones masivas.
    Sin embargo, se cita acertadamente a Setien, que concibe la ética como control de la política todopoderosa, fundamento de la historia y actualidad de la santa madre iglesia. Por tanto, la ética, política y estética deben estar al servicio de la creación de riqueza mediante la construcción.

    JEL-en agur jaunak

  3. Kasperle, zeure esteka ezin da ikusi.

    Lan ederra Imanol. Etika ideologiaren menpe kokatzen denean akabo pertsonari dagokion errespetua.

  4. Aro berrian gaudela diotenek, ez dakit euren hitzak sinisteko kapazak diren. Komunikatu honek orain dela urte bi argitaratzen zirenen antza handia dauka: http://sestaokoezkerabertzalea.wordpress.com/2012/05/02/ante-la-detencion-de-un-vecino-de-sestao-en-la-madrugada-del-primero-de-mayo/

  5. Es normal que un ex rector nazi como Heidegger esté en contra del humanismo, como bien dice la cita, traducida: “En efecto ¿que es más “lógico” que decir que a los que niegan el humanismo sólo les queda la barbarie?”. El filósofo del nazismo lo dice de modo irónico pero la ironía es que, en su caso y en el caso de los heideggerianos de extrema izquierda como Olariaga, eso es verdad.

  6. Kaxo Martin. Hemen doakizu artikulua osorik (bestela ezinezkoa zaidalako traskribitzea):

    Pseud’s corner
    The star philosopher Slavoj Zizek commits intellectual suicide in his latest film
    By Johann Hari [1] Published 30 April 2007

    The star philosopher Slavoj Zizek commits intellectual suicide in his latest film
    To the academic world’s small population of postmodernists, Slavoj Zizek – a shambling, rambling Slovenian philosopher – is a folk hero. At any lecture podium, any time, anywhere, he will emit hazy clouds of gaseous theory with the speedy intensity and comic riffs of Bill Hicks.
    He seemed to emerge fully formed from the wreckage of the former Yugoslavia with an ec lectic magpie-philosophy, rapidly spewing out books and essays on everything from opera to the use of torture in the TV series 24. Zizek is the biggest box-office draw postmodernists have ever had, their best punch at the bestseller lists. The press fawns upon him; he has been called an “intellectual rock star”; and, according to a recent profile in the New Yorker, Slovenia has a “repu tation disproportionately large for its size due to the work of Slavoj Zizek”.
    In the opening scenes of Zizek!, a new feature-length documentary, it is not hard to see why they fall for him. Zizek looks like an immense human Droopy Dawg. He talks with such babbling, neurotic force about everything from quantum physics and Hegel to Meg Ryan that, for a moment, he is hypnotic. Leading the film-makers through his chaotic transcontinental life, he jabbers to them from his bed and even takes them to a long staircase where he fantasises about killing himself – before posing as a splattered corpse on the concrete floor beneath.
    As the film progresses, however, Zizek does more than symbolically enact his own death; he commits intellectual suicide, all but admitting that his “philosophy” is a slew of nonsense. If the director, Astra Taylor, intended to make a fawning fan letter – as her cameos in the film suggest – she has failed. If she intended to shred Zizek’s credibility, she has succeeded stunningly.
    What does Slavoj Zizek believe? What does he argue for? Such obvious questions are considered vulgar among postmodernists. When you first look through the more than 50 books he has written, it is almost impossible to find an answer. It seems he seeks to splice Karl Marx with the notoriously incomprehensible French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, slathering on top an infinite number of pop-cultural references.
    His defenders claim he is trying to stretch the scope of philosophy to cover the everyday flotsam that philosophers have hitherto ignored. But gradually, as you pore through Zizek’s words or watch his audiences, whose bemusement is caught on film, you discover that the complex manner in which he expresses himself does not imply that his thought is itself subtle or complex. In fact, he seeks to revive a murderous and discredited ideology.
    Asked by an audience member what his idea of a good social order is, he replies: “Communism! I am absolutely in favour of egalitar ianism with a taste of terror.” Behind Zizek’s comedy routines, he believes we need to return to Bolshevism. He is not offering warm, fuzzy Lennonism; this is cold, bloody Leninism. Zizek writes rapturous hymns of praise to the “genius” and “strength” of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, calling him “the poli tician of the 20th century” and demanding “fidelity to Lenin’s legacy”. Just in case there is any ambiguity about the anti-democratic nature of supporting the man who erected a monstrous one-party police state in Russia, Zizek explains that Lenin’s “ultimate lesson is that only by throwing off our attachment to liberal democracy” can we become virtuous.
    This contempt for liberal democracy and preference for dictatorship is a constant in Zizek’s work. He approvingly quotes Alain Badiou, who argues: “Today the enemy is not called Empire or Capital. It’s called Democracy.” Zizek says about Benito Mussolini: “You know, the democrats in 1925 accused Mussolini: ‘You want to rule Italy, but you don’t have any programme.’ You know what was his answer? ‘We do have a programme: our programme is to rule Italy at any price.’ I love Mussolini.”
    When in the mid-1990s, the Slovenian prime minister asked Zizek if he wanted to be a government minister, he replied: “I am only interested in two posts – either minister of the interior or head of the secret police.” He condemns the language of human rights as an unacceptable brake on reconstructing Leninism. Asked about Stalin, he says: “My big worry is not being ignored, but to be accepted. People still have this idea that this guy did some bad crimes . . . It’s not as simple as that – that I am simply a Stalinist. That would be crazy, tasteless, and so on. But obviously there is something in it, that it’s not simply a joke.”
    He praises Mao Zedong’s notorious indifference to the potential large-scale loss of human life in a nuclear war as “a cosmic perspective” and a “message of courage”. He says the “terror” involved in Maoism is “nothing less than the condition of freedom”.
    When you peel back the patina of postmodernism, there is old-fashioned philo-tyrannical nonsense here. At some level, Zizek knows this is preposterous; he lived under Soviet tyranny, and even joined the opposition. Simply by putting a camera in front of him and leaving it running, Taylor shows how his façade and his ideas are crumbling. After insisting that his claim to be a Stalinist “is not a joke”, Zizek suddenly admits: “I think there was a thing called totalitarianism, and it was bad . . . You know, if I was not myself, I would arrest myself.” He then admits that his political positions are monstrous: “The worst thing is to play the ‘we are all human’ game. I am not human. I am a monster. It is not . . . that I wear the mask of a theoretician and underneath I am a warm human being. I am a monster who plays, pretends he is human.”
    Zizek expresses this monstrousness repeatedly in his writing, mocking liberals who shy away from the “cruelty” necessary to build his ideal world. He recounts with admiration this anecdote: “Walking to his theatre in July 1956, Brecht passed a column of Soviet tanks rolling towards the Stalinallee to crush the workers’ rebellion. He waved at them and later wrote in his diary that, at that moment, he was for the first time in his life tempted to join the Communist Party.” Zizek calls this “an exemplary case of the passion of the real. It wasn’t that Brecht supported the military action, but that he perceived and endor sed the violence as a sign of authenticity.”
    So is Zizek a kind of philosophers’ Borat, taking ludicrous positions to see how far he can push them? His followers dismiss every depraved political statement as an ironic joke. At times he insists he is not a comedian, that he means every word. Then he confesses in a moment of self-awareness: “My eternal fear is that if for a moment I stopped talking the whole spectacular appearance would disintegrate [and] people would think there is nobody and nothing there. They would think I am a nobody who has to pretend all the time to be a somebody.”
    As he watches his hero Jacques Lacan deliver an incomprehensible lecture on video, Zizek exclaims: “There is nothing behind this obscurity. This is just bluffing.” It is a plain moment of projection, and an unwitting confession of charlatanism. His political thought quickly descends into contradictory drivel, where he claims he is against the people who condemn the bombing of Kosovo and against the people who condone it, and calls for “a revolution without revolution”. He has, of course, constructed a convoluted epistemology to justify this, claiming that, in reality, “we can only speak about things that do not exist” and “we can ultimately only talk . . . about things we do not understand”.
    This kind of thought can only be entertained because nobody would ever take it seriously enough to act on it. When Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari say we should all become schizophrenic, when the gay Michel Foucault embraces the murderously homophobic Ayatollah Kho meini, when Zizek suggests a return to Leninist terror – these very positions are admissions that postmodernism is merely an unserious confection by intellectuals. It leads nowhere except to demoralisation and disaffection.
    Zizek! is a painful film, almost the record of a philosophical nervous breakdown. You do not end up hating Zizek, not even when he says with Stalinist relish that he wants to rehabilitate “notions of discipline, collective order, subordination”. Rather, you end up hating the academics who take this non-thought seriously. Are they really saying you can advocate tyranny as long as you throw in a few gags about Keanu Reeves? In the end, they leave us nothing but a theory-clown with bloody tears.
    “Zizek!” (unrated) is released on 4 May
    The ‘divine violence’ of Slavoj Zizek
    IPA REVIEW ARTICLE
    | Chris Berg
    Nearly half a century after 1968, Europe is again seized by sporadic outbursts of anarchic, seemingly-purposeless violence.
    The extraordinary violence in Greece brought about by that country’s sovereign debt crisis is both unfocused and unjustifiable. In May, three people died, trapped in a bank that had been firebombed by rioters.
    It’s been less than two years since the December 2008 Greek riots over the police shooting of a teenager, which also involved firebombs, the overturning of cars, the burning of hotels, shops and banks, and violent clashes with the police. Across the continent in France, torching cars has almost become a tradition in the Parisian banlieues. The strikes and protests over the French economic situation in January 2009 turned quickly violent. In Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, there were 10,000 person strong mass protests over the economic climate-before the global financial crisis, mind you-and all have been characterised by violence.
    According to Slavoj Zizek, the radical academy’s new superstar philosopher and cultural critic, that’s good violence. Or, more specifically, it’s ‘divine’.
    Zizek is the next Noam Chomsky. He’s been a visiting professor at seemingly every top-tier university: Columbia, Princeton, Chicago, and New York. He’s the author of nearly 60 books, and the star of half a dozen fawning documentaries.
    He is studied in symposiums at Melbourne University, in cultural studies and social theory subjects at Monash University, in film screenings at Sydney University, and in cinema studies at the University of Queensland. Zizek’s name pops up in The Canberra Times, The Sun Herald, and The Australian. He even made The Age’s ‘Green Guide’ TV supplement. He appeared last year at a Melbourne architecture conference, and has philosophy symposiums dedicated to his writing. Clive Hamilton, the former Greens celebrity candidate for Peter Costello’s former seat of Higgins, quoted him approvingly in a column earlier this year.
    The Times Literary Supplement calls him ‘one of the most innovative and exciting contemporary thinkers of the left’. The Chronicle of Higher Education describes him as ‘The Elvis of Cultural Theory’, but his stage presence-with academic superstars it is fair to describe their performances-is more like Robin Williams with a thick Eastern European drawl.
    Indeed, Zizek has a taste for the theatrical. His 2006 documentary where he applies psychoanalytic philosophy to popular movies titled A Pervert’s Guide to Cinema: ‘Cinema’, Zizek claims, ‘is the ultimate pervert art’. He has written introductions to collections of writings by Trotsky and Robespierre, including in both cases partial apologies for both the men and their methods. And the cover of a recent book, In Defence of Lost Causes, is illustrated with a picture of a guillotine.
    Such publicity-consciousness has its rewards. The Slovenian psychoanalytic philosopher is as close to a cult figure as the academy’s post-modernist community can produce.
    Zizek has a habit of throwing broad and shocking statements that slam down on the table, then quietly adding caveats, before finally and confidently arguing the opposite.
    Good showmanship, sure, but it has a theoretical basis. Zizek is a follower of the French psychoanalyst Jacque Lacan, who was himself a follower of Freud. Zizek uses Lacan’s concepts of the Symbolic, the Real, and the Imaginary – they all require capitalisation – to describe, not things which are real, symbolic, or imaginary, but things which are true to themselves, or symbolic in the realm of pure language.
    That’s only the half of it.
    Lacanian psychoanalytic philosophy is infamously impenetrable. Alan Sheridan, who first translated Lacan into English described this lack of clarity as wilful. ‘Lacan,’ Sheridan argued, ‘doesn’t intend to be understood … He designs his seminars so that you can’t, in fact, grasp them.’
    For all the complexity of postmodernism, when you read such post-modern luminaries such as Lacan, you can’t help but get a nagging feeling that it is an elaborate prank.
    Zizek wears the clothes of postmodernism, and that parodic sensation is more overt. There is the same wordplay with jarringly capitalised adjectives, and reference to the ‘master-signifier’ pattern that controls history, but it feels like criticising Zziek does nothing more than broadcast that you have missed his joke. One could not describe the Disney movie Kung-Fu Panda as the best description of contemporary political ideology without some degree of ironic detachment.
    Nevertheless, for all of Zizek’s movie analogies, his blurry theory and his post-modern theatricality, they have a largely simple message.
    More openly than his academic rockstar predecessors Chomsky, Foucault and Sartre, Zizek is an unashamed and unremitting revolutionary Marxist. As Johann Hari wrote in the New Statesman in 2007, ‘When you peel back the patina of postmodernism, there is old-fashioned philo-tyrannical nonsense here.’
    According to Zizek, capitalism is violence: ‘the self-propelling metaphysical dance of capital runs the show’, providing the ‘fundamental systemic violence of capitalism … this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their “evil” intentions, but is purely “objective”, systemic, and anonymous’.
    The market economy may seem like a web of peaceful interactions for mutual benefit, but really it is supported by aggression and oppression. When the government of a nominally capitalist country goes to war, the marketplace is to blame.
    The awful events that occurred in Abu Ghraib were not crimes, but manifestations of the American economic system: ‘Iraqi prisoners were effectively initiated into American culture’.
    So, for Zizek, the clash between Islamist terrorism and the Western world is not a clash between barbarism and civilisation, but between two types of barbarism, ‘a clash between anonymous brutal torture and torture as a media spectacle’. Zizek’s 2009 book, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, expands on this theme. The two big events of the first decade of the twenty-first century – the destruction of the Twin Towers, and the Global Financial Crisis – spell the end of the liberal order, destroyed once by the violence of radical Islam, and then again by the violence of the collapsing share market.
    What is striking about Zizek’s argument so far is how common this view is.
    Zizek is clearer than most, but the moral equivalence of capitalism and barbarism has been one of the radical left’s primary themes since well before September 2001. Michael Leunig wrote in The Age in March this year that ‘Our culture has thrived on the stabbing impulse … If schoolboys stopped being violent, the empire and the free market would surely crumble … Our unique brand of civilisation depends as much upon conflict and annihilation as it does upon co-operation.’
    When we read that the ever-repeated claim that the Iraq War was a war for oil we are being told that maintaining the ‘system’ of trade and globalisation, by definition, requires the occasional violent invasion of other countries.
    Never mind that a much cheaper way to acquire Iraqi oil would have been to do the capitalist thing and just buy it. The cost of the Iraq war is now well over one trillion dollars.
    Still: in the minds of many in the radical left, warfare is not only a necessary condition for the existence of capitalism, but its most pertinent feature. Zizek and his co-ideologists use the literal violence of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to damn what they imagine is the more perverse violence of the competitive marketplace.
    These beliefs allow writers like John Pilger to claim, as he did in New Statesman in May, that the International Monetary Fund and ‘neoliberalism’ is an ‘occupying force’, writing that the Greek protestors ‘are clear who the enemy is and regard themselves as once again under foreign occupation. And once again, they are rising up, with courage.’
    It is in those protests that Zizek detects ‘divine violence’. Divine violence is an act of violence not for revenge, or to achieve a political goal, but an act of violence so extreme that it upsets the fabric of the social order; terror deployed for political purpose, but with no political goals, outside the disestablishment of the status quo. The Terror of the French Revolution was divine violence-a radical break with the past-as the revolutionaries who rejected the social norms and habits of society.
    It is only through extreme violence-which is gasping out in contemporary Europe-that the world can earn its redemption, and the break from capitalism can finally be made.
    This distinction between violent acts and divinely violent acts is Zizek’s key to history, allowing him to dismiss the monsters he dislikes, and defend those whose aims he supports.
    Adolf Hitler may have been a brute, but he was a brute in Zizek’s eyes, because his Holocaust was fundamentally conservative – it sought to defend a status quo rather than traumatise the world into a higher level. In Violence, Zizek writes:
    If one means by violence of the basic social relations, then as crazy or tasteless as it may sound, the problem with historical monsters who slaughtered millions was that they were not violent enough.
    In In Defence of Lost Causes, he writes:
    … crazy, tasteless even, as it may sound, the problem with Hitler was that he was not violent enough, that his violence was not ‘essential’ enough. Nazism was not radical enough, it did not dare to disturb the basic structure of the modern capitalist social space (which is why it had to focus on destroying an invented external enemy, Jews).
    … Hitler did not ‘have the courage’ to really change things; he did not really act, all his actions were fundamentally reactions, that is, he acted so that nothing would really change, he staged a great spectre of Revolution so that the capitalist order could survive.
    This is, incidentally, a charge he apparently also lays at the feet of Pol Pot in his upcoming book, Living in the End Times – that Pot did not go ‘far enough’. (The moral contrast with John Pilger, who played the major role in exposing the murderous Pol Pot regime to the West, could not be stronger.)
    To those who might object, Zizek quotes Robespierre’s denunciation of critics of divine violence who focus on the victims of terror: ‘A sensibility that wails almost exclusively over the enemies of liberty seems suspect to me. Stop shaking the tyrant’s bloody robe in my face, or I will believe that you wish to put Rome in chains.’
    That, certainly, is the message sent by the anarchist faction of the Greek rioters, whose response to their government’s austerity measures was to murder three bank workers. Writing of the mob violence of Haiti under Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Zizek says:
    Although we are dealing with what can only appear as ‘immoral’ acts of killing, one has no political right to condemn them, because they are a response to years, centuries even, of systematic state and economic violence and exploitation.
    For those Greek rioters, this makes sense.
    If James Bond is granted a licence to kill by the state, the mob is granted a licence to indiscriminate terror by Slavoj Zizek.

  7. Kasperle, oso linka interesgarria. Egia esan, ez naiz asko harritu, ez bainuen bestelakorik espero. Deritzan “Ezker Abrtzale” horrek biolentziaren arteko diferentziak aipatu ditu beti; izan ere haurek egindakoa ona eta bestearena txarra. Hori dela eta, ideologia iturriak antzekoak izan beharko ziren eta halaxe izaten dira.

    Nik ez dakit zergatik jendeak Bilduri siñisten dion, egunen baten, batenbatek explikatu beharko…

  8. Martin1:”nik ez dakit zergaitik jendeak Bilduri siñisten dion,egunen
    baten,batenbatek explikatu beharko…”
    Indar politiko abertzale bat ere barruan dagoelako,eta bere jarrai-
    tzaileak beroiekin daudelako,indar abertzale ez direnak,bietara joka-
    tzen duelako,independentzia herriaren askatasuna balitza bezala
    idazten eta esaten dutelako,eta sozialismo marxista ez dutela-
    ko nabarmentzen beren argudio popularrean,eta batez ere etenga-
    beko borrokan jarraitzen dutelako,eta beste alderdiak,abertzaleak,
    ez dutelako borroka hori egiten,ezpetxean daudenak “Salvapatrias”
    batzuk bezala agertzen dituztelako,eta,eta,eta….


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